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“Why are they hoarding data?” is not a question any debt management office should invite, yet that is precisely where we are as Nigeria waits for public debt figures that should already be in circulation.

The Debt Management Office has not released Nigeria’s public debt data as of September 2025, even though, by its established publication pattern, those figures ought to have appeared around December 2025, typically before the Christmas break and certainly before year-end when analysts tidy up their annual models.

December came and went with festive optimism, January followed with reform-season speeches and investor briefings, and we now sit in mid-February still refreshing the website.

The delay is roughly three months beyond the expected cycle, which in ordinary bureaucratic life may seem trivial but in capital markets feels conspicuous and invites interpretation.

Silence in public finance rarely functions as a neutral placeholder, because investors tend to treat missing data not as an administrative hiccup but as a potential signal.

Historically, the DMO has maintained a fairly dependable rhythm that allowed the market to plan around it with confidence and precision.

March data typically arrives in June, June numbers surface in September, and September figures are released in December, thereby creating a predictable cadence that analysts build into debt sustainability frameworks and refinancing projections.

That rhythm matters because Nigeria’s debt profile is not a peripheral statistic tucked into an appendix, but the backbone of conversations about fiscal sustainability, refinancing risk, and macroeconomic resilience.

Without the September 2025 data, several critical questions remain suspended in uncertainty.

Has total public debt crossed another symbolic threshold that will shape headline narratives?

What is the updated split between domestic and external obligations, particularly in a year defined by exchange-rate volatility?

How much of any increase reflects fresh borrowing decisions, and how much is the mechanical consequence of currency depreciation repricing existing external debt?

Where does the debt-to-GDP trajectory now stand following GDP rebasing and fiscal adjustments? Has the debt-service-to-revenue ratio eased, stabilised, or tightened its grip?

In a high interest rate environment with persistent exchange-rate pressure, these are not academic exercises for conference panels but live variables in risk-pricing models and portfolio allocation decisions.

The September numbers would capture the cumulative impact of domestic issuances across 2025, incorporate any multilateral disbursements or Eurobond activity, and reveal whether subnational borrowing trends are accelerating or stabilising.

They would also clarify developments around Ways and Means conversions or securitisation adjustments, which remain central to understanding the true structure of public liabilities.

Nigeria’s debt dynamics are especially sensitive to currency movements because external obligations, when translated into naira, can swell dramatically without a single additional dollar being borrowed.

If the naira weakened further between June and September, the nominal debt stock could have risen sharply even if fiscal authorities exercised restraint on new external issuance.

Markets draw a careful distinction between structural fiscal expansion and valuation-driven increases, since one suggests policy loosening while the other reflects exchange-rate mechanics that may be temporary or cyclical.

This is why transparency operates not merely as a governance virtue but as a market instrument.